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This paper derives a stochastic endogenous growth model to investigate the impact of European
Union (EU) integration on convergence and productivity growth. The theoretical model implies both
temporary and permanent positive effects of the integration process. The empirical part of the
analysis uses structural break tests and data envelopment analysis to examine the accession process
of ﬁve recent members to the EU15. The results show (i) endogenously identiﬁed accession dates as
structural breaks, (ii) improved rates of productivity growth after accession over and above the
Union benchmark level, and (iii) increased pace of overall growth due to capital accumulation as a
result of institutional features of the Union such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. These ﬁndings
support the theoretical model, implying that economic integration is beneﬁcial for member countries,
especially from a long-run perspective, and Cohesion and Structural funds help the new members
catch up with the core-EU members’ standard of living.
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In an age where many countries strive to join the European Union (EU) although
countries like Switzerland and Norway constantly refuse to join, it is natural to ask
whether EU membership has any long and/or short run beneﬁts. Although the effects of
joining an economic union have been studied extensively because of their implications for
policymakers, it is quite difﬁcult to measure the overall beneﬁts of integration because it
impacts many aspects of an economy. Even studies focusing on a speciﬁc effect of
integration on growth have provided incomplete conclusions because they had to use
proxies to represent the integration process.1 These proxies, such as trade, foreign direct
investment (FDI), research and development (R&D) expenditures, number of patents
issued, and time series dummies are limited in scope, and hence they can only partially
capture the overall impact of joining a union. Besides being unobservable, such proxies can
lead to false inferences, because of endogeneity and causality issues.2 While the biggest
beneﬁt one expects from entering into a union like the EU is the rise in living standards
through a high level of cooperation in all economic, political and institutional aspects, it is
very difﬁcult to envisage a proxy for such a complex network of cooperation and sharing
of knowledge.
In this paper, we investigate the beneﬁts of integration on economic growth,
productivity and convergence, speciﬁcally focusing on knowledge spillovers. We employ
alternative ways to detect and decompose these unobservable beneﬁts without restricting
ourselves to one speciﬁc proxy. To accomplish our objective of observing the outcome of
broad and multifaceted institutional and technological cooperation, we propose to focus
on how the growth process changes following the EU membership. Detecting such changes
may not be sufﬁcient, however, because they could be to the result of other factors. Hence,
in order to connect the sharing of knowledge to growth, one needs to measure changes in
productive as well as technological capabilities. In this paper, we aim to obtain evidence of
such abstract beneﬁts by decomposing signiﬁcant developments in growth into observable
changes in economic variables (inputs) and the not-so-observable changes in productivity
and efﬁciency. We also control for the institutional facet of integration, namely the net
budget transfers such as the Structural and Cohesion Funds, so that the effects of
knowledge spillovers and integration on growth could be separated from the effects of such
capital ﬂows.
More speciﬁcally, our research extends the stochastic endogenous growth literature to
capture the impact of economic integration on convergence and productivity growth.
Applying Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s (1991, RB-R hereafter) analytical hypothesis that
integration leads to sharing of knowledge and technology, we develop a new theoretical
framework to capture the effects of integration on growth. Using RB-R’s hypothesis, we
are able to extend the work of Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1997, LPS hereafter) to examine
changes in productivity and convergence rate after the accession to a union. We
subsequently test the theoretical claims of our model using a battery of structural break1Many examples are cited in the next section.
2Regarding estimation problems such as causality and endogeneity, Frankel and Romer (1999) argue that trade
variables employed in previous growth studies may be endogenous. Walde and Wood (2004) conclude that the
existing literature is ‘‘quiet’’ on the direction of the true causality in the trade–growth relationship. Yanikkaya
(2003) reports similar ﬁndings.
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integration on a number of dimensions. In a nutshell, our ﬁndings show that integration
into an economic union has direct (capital accumulation) and indirect (technology
transfer) effects on a country’s growth process. The institutional aspects of the EU
integration, such as the Structural and Cohesion Funds programme, also seem to play an
effective role in furthering economic convergence and growth.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy review the earlier work and
discuss our contribution in light of these studies. Section 3 sets out our theoretical model.
We describe our estimation technique in Section 4 while data description and empirical
results are given in Section 5. The last section provides a summary of the key ﬁndings of
the paper and its policy implications.2. Beneﬁts of economic integration
Early studies of the effects of regional integration rely on foreign trade variables to
capture the effects of integration. Baldwin and Seghezza (1996) examine the beneﬁts of
integration by employing trade barriers both in growth and investment equations but ﬁnd
no evidence of a technology-boosting impact. However, they note that the investment
coefﬁcient in the growth equation is likely to pick up some of the technology impact on
growth, and, thus, it is hardly possible to isolate the trade impact from innovation.
Baldwin (2000) reports that trade policies do not have a signiﬁcant negative effect on GDP
or productivity growth. Using time dummies and the experience of both European
Community (EC) and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries, Henrekson et al.
(1997) examine the role of trade and institutional integration on economic growth. They
ﬁnd a positive impact of European integration on growth suggested by a statistically
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the EC/EFTA dummy variable.3
The literature on the direct effects of trade has been extended to allow trade to facilitate
technology transfer. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Coe and Helpman (1995, CH
henceforth) view business innovation as an important element of technical progress. While
the former study shows that it is difﬁcult to draw conclusions on the growth effects of trade
restrictions, the latter claims that a country’s factor productivity depends not only on its
own but also on its main trading partners’ R&D capital stocks. Using R&D expenditures
as a proxy for knowledge, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant link between productivity and R&D
capital stocks in EU and other industrial countries, indicating signiﬁcant international
R&D spillovers. Kao et al. (1999) reconsider CH’s results by utilizing panel cointegration
tests. They ﬁnd that small economies tend to beneﬁt more from R&D spillovers than do
large economies and that the beneﬁcial impact of trade is not as high as CH’s estimates.
Engelbrecht (1997) also extends CH’s study by including a human capital variable to
capture innovation, which he argues may not be accounted solely by R&D capital stock.
He ﬁnds that human capital has a signiﬁcant effect on economic growth besides R&D.
Using data for OECD countries, Grifﬁth et al. (2004) conﬁrm the importance of R&D and3More recent studies focus on the new member states. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2002) report that the length of
EU membership has a signiﬁcant and positive effect on growth, and it is higher for poorer countries, suggesting an
asymmetric impact of EU membership. Martin and Vela´zquez (2001), Wagner and Hlouskova (2002) and Boldrin
and Canova (2003) derive lessons from the experience of the previous accession countries for the new member
states.
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innovation but also for technological catch-up.
A second popular stand-in for integration is FDI, which was used by Dohrn et al. (2001)
to detect a positive correlation between the economic growth and FDI per capita. However,
they argue that the direction of causation is difﬁcult to establish.4 Indeed, Gao (2005) shows
that both FDI and growth respond endogenously to economic integration, hence any
relationship between FDI and growth does not necessarily imply a meaningful causality
link. Similarly, Saggi (2000) argues that convincing evidence of the superiority of FDI as the
vehicle of technology transfers is hard to ﬁnd. Conversely, other studies emphasize the
importance of spillovers from inward investment to technical progress in EU economies
(Barrell and Pain, 1997, 1999). In short, the literature suggests that it is difﬁcult to estimate
the impact of integration on growth by relying on proxies for integration.
We deal with these legitimate concerns by providing an alternative approach to estimate
the unobservable process of ‘‘innovation and exchange of ideas’’. To do so, we extend the
stochastic neoclassical growth model of LPS by implementing the ‘integration parameter’
of RB-R to analyze the effects of EU accession. We assume that integration process allows
access to a wider body of knowledge and hence leads to higher productivity by enhancing
the effectiveness of labor, also speeding up the convergence process. Using a series of
structural break tests and a data envelopment exercise, we validate the implications of our
theoretical model. In this respect, we endogenously identify accession dates using
structural breaks, make inferences about permanent and temporary effects of integration,
and isolate technological effects of integration (i.e., sharing of knowledge). In these tests,
we also control for the turbulence in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the Union
and the completion of the Single Market that took place in 1992.
Another important aspect of our paper is that we control for the institutional facet of
integration, namely the net budget transfers such as the Structural and Cohesion Funds, so
that the effects of knowledge integration on growth could be separated from the effects of
such capital ﬂows. The Structural and Cohesion Funds, which account for about one third
of the Union’s budget, provide support to improve infrastructure and the telecommunica-
tions network, develop human resources, and fund research and development in order to
reduce regional disparities in the Union. Given the recent enlargement of the Union to 25
member states on May 2004 and the current enlargement plans in the near future, the
impact of such funds on economic convergence and growth in the region has become a
highly debated issue. As the current round of Structural and Cohesion Funds programmes
are about to be completed soon, the European Commission has recently announced its
plans for the next round for the period of 2007–2013. Negations are now under way
between member states and EU to decide on regions that would be eligible for funds.
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of Structural and Cohesion Funds on growth can
best be described as mixed, however. Besides the work of the European Commission
(2001), Fayolle and Lecuyer (2000), Solanes and Ramon (2002) and Beugelsdijk and
Eijfﬁnger (2003) ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant effect of Structural and Cohesion Funds on4As far as cross-country studies, Durham (2004), Carkovic and Levine (2002) and Alfaro et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a robust relationship between FDI and economic growth. Furthermore, they show that the
effect of FDI on growth depends on the ‘‘absorptive capacity’’ of the home country. Borensztein et al. (1998)
argue that FDI’s growth impact goes beyond its inﬂuence on the total investment; it also depends on the stock of
human capital in that country, suggesting that the beneﬁts of higher FDI are realized not only through capital
accumulation, but also through efﬁciency gains.
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policies do not foster economic growth. The results are also shown to be sensitive to the
assumption made about country-speciﬁc steady states (Ederveen and Gorter, 2002). Our
paper contributes to this literature as well by providing empirical evidence whether such
funds can enhance economic growth in the Union.3. Theoretical framework
Following RB-R, we assume that economic integration leads to a long-run growth rate
increase in the member countries, while improvements in trade can have only transitory
effects. Economic integration between developed economies enables goods and ideas to
ﬂow from one country to the next much more easily, enhancing growth over time. The
production function used in RB-R is
Y ¼ HaLb
Z Z
0
xðiÞ1ab di, (1)
where H is human capital and Z is the capital enhancing innovation, capital equalsRZ
0 xðiÞdi, and i is the index of the most recently invented good. According to their
assumptions,5 patents for innovations, which are normally traded, are shared after
integration; Z of cooperating countries increases at a low cost, the model becomes
symmetric and enables us to substitute K/Z for x(i). We simplify the notation by adopting
exogenous productivity growth, A, as in LPS, rather than growth of human capital,
H. LPS develop a stochastic neoclassical growth model to investigate the biases
in convergence rate estimates when productivity growth is ignored. In our research,
we utilize the same stochastic model but we incorporate in it the integration parameter of
RB-R, yielding the following reduced form production function
Yit ¼ KaitðAitLitZitÞ1a; where 0oao1. (2)
In such a formulation, the body of knowledge, Z, is an unobservable stochastic process,
and it is therefore difﬁcult to identify its determinants in practice although factors such as
the volume of international trade, FDI, R&D, etc., should clearly be seen as key drivers. In
this regard, our model encompasses as special cases the previous research that used proxies
for Z (CH, 1995; Grifﬁth et al., 2004). We aim to ﬁnd a more general and comprehensive
effect of integration, namely the sharing of knowledge among members of the integration
scheme because using R&D stock as a proxy may be too restrictive or prone to
mismeasurement due to possible overlaps with the ﬂow of funds between the member
countries. Nevertheless, as in previous studies, we seek to uncover the improvements in Z
that are expected after integration via better dissemination of ideas and technologies
through numerous channels that are either unobservable or difﬁcult to proxy. In an
attempt to better capture the integration effects associated with the diffusion of ideas, we
control for the well publicized and widely debated effects of convergence-directed
Structural and Cohesion Funds as well as of FDI inﬂows on growth.6 In such a ﬂuid5Capital goods are substitutes for consumption goods, so their prices are determined by technology.
6As mentioned earlier, the empirical evidence on the impact of cohesion policy on convergence and growth is
mixed. The results are sensitive to the assumption as to how and where such funds are used, suggesting that the
empirical results can best be interpreted as showing a ‘‘potential’’ impact on growth (Ederveen and Gorter, 2002).
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large inﬂows of capital in the form of structural funds, FDI, etc., our model allows for the
possibility of short run or temporary inefﬁciencies in resource allocation.7 Not allowing for
such inefﬁciencies may lead to false inferences about total factor productivity (TFP).
Hence, Eq. (2) is modiﬁed to
Yit
yit
¼ KaitðAitLitZitÞ1a, (20)
where values of yit less than 1 indicate instances of inefﬁciency, in which the production
level is below the efﬁcient frontier. One should note that yit can be moved to inside the
parentheses and interpreted as efﬁciency of labor or as shown below enter the model as
inefﬁciency in investment. The empirical section elaborates on how the measurement of the
inefﬁciency parameter is separated from that of A.
Capital formation is given by
Kit ¼ I i;t1 þ ð1 dÞKi;t1,
I it ¼ ðsi þ f iÞ
Yit
yit
, ð3Þ
where si and d are the domestic savings and depreciation rates, yit is the efﬁciency in
production or investment (see Greenwood et al., 1997; Hercowitz, 1998; Krussel,1998),
and fi represents the inﬂow (outﬂow when negative) of foreign savings in the form of
Structural and Cohesion Funds. We treat these funds differently from other capital ﬂows.
Following the European Commission (2001), we assume these funds are directed to
investment projects that have positive payoffs. Because the income level of the joining
country determines fi, these inﬂows will be higher for laggard countries. Furthermore, they
will tend to raise the beneﬁts for these ‘‘new’’ members, who had lower than average per
capita GDP levels. Then, the evolution of the capital stock is
D logðkitÞ ¼ D logðAitLitZitÞ þ log
ðsi þ f iÞ
yit1
k
ð1aÞ
i;t1 þ 1 d
 
, (4)
where kit ¼ Kit=AitLitZit is the effective capital because enhancements in capital, Z,
increase the effectiveness of labor. We follow the stochastic path of the solution to this
growth problem proposed by LPS subject to the following
logðAitÞ ¼ a0i þ gitþ uait, (5)
uait ¼ raiuai;t1 þ ait; where jraijp1, (6)
logðLitÞ ¼ l0i þ nitþ ulit, (7)
ulit ¼ rliuli;t1 þ lit; where jrlijp1, (8)
where the technology shock, uait, captures exogenous factors that might shift TFP (other
than growth of technology, gi), and the employment shock, ulit, represents labor market(footnote continued)
For example, the European Commission (2001) assumes the funds add to (productive) public investment. For a
survey of the literature on the effects of cohesion policy on growth and convergence, see Ederveen et al. (2002).
7Inefﬁciencies occur if observed factor income shares are not the cost-minimizing factor income shares, implying
that factors are not paid the value of their marginal product as assumed in standard growth accounting approaches.
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RB-R, we add the approximate stochastic process for Zit
logðZitÞ ¼ zi0 þ zitþ uzit, (9)
where zi is the rate of innovation. We stress that we thus separate standard factor
productivity growth into two components, exogenous productivity growth, gi, and capital
enhancing innovations, zi, diffused through a range of economic interactions with other
members of the Union. We expect that the mean of the regionally inﬂuenced productivity
growth rate, g¯, is approximately equal to the exogenous productivity growth of the
integrated countries. The rate of diffusion of innovations, zi, represents the information
inﬂow into the new member country, which then raises the new member’s productivity
growth over and above that of the Union. In essence, the integration process fosters
convergence by improving the new members’ productivity growth rates to levels higher
than that of the Union ðgi þ zi4g¯Þ. The empirical section attempts to quantify the effect of
the sharing of knowledge on new members’ growth by separating the exogenous (or
regional) productivity growth from the integration related one, zi. We do not impose a
dynamic structure for the efﬁciency term, yit, since its time path is likely to be ‘‘noisy’’ due
to the lumpiness of fund inﬂows and as well as large differences in the speed with which
different types of fund inﬂows are absorbed into the capital stock. A ﬁnal assumption we
make in Eq. (9) is the identical autocorrelation in uzit as in the technological process, uait.
Using the fact that expected change in effective capital is zero in the steady state
(omitting the subscript i), we obtain
nþ gþ z ¼ E log ðsþ f Þ
y1
kð1aÞ1 þ 1 d
  
, (10)
where kN is the random variable that underlies the steady-state distribution of kt and
yN ¼ 1 is the steady state level of efﬁciency.
Utilizing Jensen’s inequality, this term equals
nþ gþ z ¼ logððsþ f Þ eð1aÞE½logðk1Þ þ 1 dÞ þ h. (11)
The approximation of the nonlinear term in this equation around E½logðk1Þ yields
logððsþ f Þkð1aÞt1 þ 1 dÞ ¼ g ð1 lÞ log kt1 þ xt, (12)
where, for small values of n, g, z, d, and h,
1 l  ð1 aÞðnþ gþ dþ z hÞ (13)
and
g  ðnþ gþ z hÞ þ ðnþ gþ zþ d hÞ½logðsþ f Þ  logðnþ gþ dþ z hÞ. (14)
In the deterministic version of the model, the linearization is around the steady state,
where k and the u’s are assumed to be zero. For h ¼ 0, the term (1l) is the measure of
beta convergence. Deﬁning log output per capita as
logðY=LÞ ¼ xt ¼ at þ zt þ a logðktÞ, (15)
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Dxt ¼ Dat þ Dzt þ a ðnþ gþ zÞ  Dut þ g ð1 lÞ
xt1  a0  z0  ðgþ zÞðt 1Þ  ua  uz
a
 
.
(16)
Using Eqs. (5)–(9), we can rewrite Eq. (16) as
xt ¼ mþ ð1 lÞðgþ zÞtþ lxt1 þ et, (17)
where
m ¼ lðgþ zÞ  aðnþ gþ zÞ þ agþ ð1 lÞða0 þ z0Þ (18)
and
et ¼ Duat þ Duzt  aDut þ ð1 lÞðuat1 þ uzt1Þ,
Dut ¼ Duat þ Dult þ Duzt. ð19Þ
In the context of the Solow growth model ð0oao1Þ, output will have a unit root only if
et has a unit root. LPS show that the unit root in e depends only on the unit root in the
technology shock, in their case, ua. In our model, it depends on the unit root in the joint
shock component, namely, ua and uz. Therefore, assuming rl ¼ 1 and ra ¼ r, as in LPS,
and changing the notation for the autocorrelation in ua,
8 we derive our testable equation
xt ¼ ½ð1 rÞmþ ð1 lÞðgþ zÞrþ ð1 lÞð1 rÞðgþ zÞtþ ðlþ rÞxt1  lrxt2 þ ð1 cLÞt,
(20)
where et is a composite error term
9 from Eqs. (6), (8), and (9), and c is a nonlinear function
of variances/covariances of technology, employment, innovations, and other parameters of
the model. With additional assumptions, LPS show that this equation can be written in
the form
ð1 lLÞð1 rLÞxt ¼ ½ð1 rÞmþ ð1 lÞðgþ zÞr þ ð1 lÞð1 rÞðgþ zÞtþ ð1 cLÞt.
(21)
The main implication of the LPS model, where the z is not accounted for, is that
countries would have different speeds of convergence and productivity growth rates;
hence, the standard estimation techniques such as augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF),
would not produce reliable inferences about the speeds of convergence.10 We use a similar
model and show that integration has an impact on (i) the rate of growth by increasing the
steady state value, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of Eq. (20), (ii) on the convergence
rate in Eq. (13), and (iii) on productivity growth, the coefﬁcient of the deterministic trend
in Eq. (20).
As in the LPS methodology, a further simpliﬁcation of the testable speciﬁcation is
possible by assuming that the convergence rate and the autocorrelation in technology8This simpliﬁcation of the autocorrelation term will not matter for the estimation procedure because our
methodology allows for a wide range of serial correlations in the error term, even in the unit root case.
9The ﬁrst order moving average form will depend on certain restrictions on the correlation between the
employment shock and the joint technology shock.
10This is because the autoregressive coefﬁcient tested is the product of many variables such as r, a, g, n, d, h, and
z with our addition, and thus the existence of a unit root in output is not necessarily evidence against the
neoclassical model, because it can be caused by a unit root in the technology process (r ¼ 1).
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transforms the system into
xt ¼ mþ ð1 lÞðgþ zÞtþ lxt1 þ t, (22)
where
m ¼ lðgþ zÞ  ahþ ð1 lÞfa0 þ z0 þ ða=1 aÞ½logðsþ f Þ  logðnþ gþ zþ d hÞg.
(23)
This system is a modiﬁed version of the frequently adopted method of convergence tests
with the addition of the possibility of changes in the steady state term and in productivity
growth. To estimate l and ðgþ zÞ separately, LPS suggest rewriting the equation as
xit ¼ ci þ ðgi þ ziÞtþ uit,
uit ¼ liui;t1 þ Zit, ð24Þ
giving us our ﬁnal estimation equation. Separating l and ðgþ zÞ prevents any false
inferences about convergence that could result from the presence of a unit root in
productivity growth. Using the ﬁtted values of these equations, we obtain mi by noting that
mi ¼ ð1 liÞci þ liðgi þ ziÞ. (25)
It is apparent that one cannot identify both gi and zi from these speciﬁcations, but a
sudden change in the integration process could generate a structural shift in per capita
GDP. Hence, searching for structural breaks in all of our parameters is a major part of our
empirical methodology. To be precise, we expect to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant breaks in
the steady state due to an increase in the investment rate, (s+f), and in both productivity
growth and convergence rates due to integration, zi.
The next section describes our further attempts at identifying zi. In the second part of
our estimation section, we examine TFP growth in more detail in an attempt to capture
the pure impact of integration on productivity and to separate its effect from that of other
factors.
4. Empirical methodology
In our estimations we allow for differences in the country characteristics, but we are
careful to avoid confusing the effects of regional events from those of integration. We use a
benchmark country already in the Union to remove the regional effects. This allows us to
evaluate the pure impact of the integration process, netting out the impact of events
affecting the whole region. We use France as the benchmark country to represent the EU
core.12 Therefore, the estimated system given by Eq. (24) becomes
xit  x¯t ¼ ðci  c¯Þ þ ðgi þ zi  g¯Þtþ ðuit  u¯tÞ,
ðuit  u¯tÞ ¼ liðui;t1  u¯t1Þ þ ðZit  Z¯tÞ, ð26Þ11This is a very important assumption for the accurate measurement of the convergence rate because changes in
the convergence rate could be driven by changes in the serial correlation in technology. We rely on LPS’s (1997)
empirical ﬁnding of this equality and identifying only eight exceptions to it in a sample of more than 100 countries.
12We do not use Germany because of the potential structural break in data due to its uniﬁcation with East
Germany.
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x¯t ¼ c¯þ g¯tþ u¯,
u¯t ¼ lu¯t1 þ Z¯t. ð27Þ
Note that Eq. (27) would not contain a structural break caused by integration. This is
mainly because we use a country that had already joined the Union much earlier than did
the newcomers, and thus garnered the beneﬁts and experienced the structural breaks before
the time covered by this study. An additional advantage of subtracting the benchmark
from each new member prior to the structural break tests is that we get estimates of the net
impact of integration, zi. Since the expected value of gi is g¯, the expected slope coefﬁcient in
Eq. (26) will be equal to zi.
13
In the initial part of our estimations, we use a ﬁltering process, which initially extracts
information on the levels of, and breaks in, the deterministic trend components
of the GDP per capita difference from the French benchmark and then estimates the
convergence rate. We start by identifying the parameters of Eq. (26) with the help of
structural break tests. We estimate the impact of integration on the de-trended per capita
data, using France to represent the common European trend. However, a system such
as Eq. (26) is difﬁcult to estimate, especially under the possibility of the existence of
a unit root in the error process uit or of structural breaks in the parameters ci, li and gi.
Therefore, we ﬁrst need to ensure that the inference we get on the parameters under
high serial correlation (or breaks) in the error term is correct. To do so, we use the
methodology proposed by Vogelsang (1998). Using the trend function hypothesis he
developed, we divide our estimation into two parts, namely the estimation of the levels
and breaks in the parameters ci and gi in the ﬁrst stage, and the convergence coefﬁcient li in
the second. Vogelsang’s (2001) more recent extension allows for a single structural break
by modifying the earlier statistics after including the possibility of shifts in the trend
function.
yt ¼ m1DU1t þ m2DU2t þ d1DT1t þ d2DT2t þ ut, (28)
where DU1t ¼ 1 if tpTb (the break date) and zero otherwise, DU2t ¼ 1 if t4Tb and
zero otherwise, DT1t ¼ t if tpTb and zero otherwise, and ﬁnally DT2t ¼ t Tb if t4Tb
and zero otherwise. Of the two possible versions of the test, we favor the one that detects
breaks endogenously, not imposing a break date in the estimations. Finding breaks
endogenously around the times of accession is a direct evidence in support of our theory
since they verify the existence of the productivity effects mentioned in Eq. (24). Appendix
A.1, provides more detailed information on Vogelsang’s methodologies.
Despite their ﬂexibility in allowing for various types of serial correlation in the error
term, the Vogelsang tests are limited for the purposes of our study because they allow for
only a single break and cannot analyze breaks in the autoregressive parameters, in our
case, the convergence rate. Because our model foresees changes in the mean, trend, and the
autoregressive parameter, we supplement Vogelsang’s test results with the stochastic
multiple-break test developed by Bai and Perron (1998, BP henceforth).13If needed, the coefﬁcient values in Eq. (24) can be obtained by adding the estimates of Eq. (26) to those of
Eq. (27).
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structural break model, with m breaks (m+1 regimes)
yt ¼ x0tgj þ ut (29)
for t ¼ Tj1 þ 1; . . . ;Tj and j ¼ 1; . . . ;mþ 1. yt is the observed dependent variable at time
t; xt (q 1) is the vector of covariates, and gj is the corresponding vector of coefﬁcients,
and ut is the disturbance term at time t. The break points (Tj) are treated as unknown, and
are estimated together with the unknown coefﬁcients when T observations are available.
Even though the deﬁnition of zt in the BP test is general enough to allow the testing of
breaks in the mean, trend, and the autoregressive parameters simultaneously, we opt for a
two-stage method for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that the BP test performs poorly in detecting
multiple structural changes in the trending terms and possible unit roots.14 The second
reason is that the analysis of the autoregressive form in Eq. (22) would yield incorrect
inferences about the structural break of the trend parameter due to its nonlinear nature in
the parameters of interest, l and g+z. In this two-stage method, we ﬁrst utilize the
parameter estimates from the Stage 1 regressions (Vogelsang, 2001) to de-trend the GDP
per capita differences from benchmark. Then, in Stage 2, we concentrate on the underlying
autoregressive process of the residual series. The beneﬁt of the two-stage estimation
mechanism is that it allows us to use a method that derives inferences about a deterministic
(single) trend break regardless of the serial correlation in the error term, while the second
stage allows the reliable measurement of multiple breaks in the autoregressive error term.
More information on BP’s methodology can be found in Appendix A.2.
Even though the structural break tests allow us to test the predictions of our theoretical
model, it is not clear whether the effects we ﬁnd are caused by the dispersion of knowledge or
accumulation of capital via structural fund payments. In other words, the breaks we ﬁnd in the
growth trend could be due to (i) the countries’ own capital accumulation and their transition to
the new steady state or (ii) due to endogenous growth in the steady state due to the technological
diffusion of ideas and knowledge. In order to better identify the underlying reason for our
structural break results, as a ﬁnal part of our estimations, we propose to decompose the
production process of sample countries to measure their Malmquist productivity indexes.
Introduced by Caves et al. (1982), and later developed by Fa¨re et al. (1994), Malmquist
indexes can be used to measure productivity by using information on only input and
output quantities. Their non-parametric Malmquist measure relies on constructing a best-
practice frontier for the whole sample and then computing the distance of individual
observations from that frontier. Using non-parametric programming, the index can be
partitioned exhaustively into useful component measures, namely technical change (shift of
frontier or z in our analysis) and efﬁciency change (change of proximity to frontier or y in
our analysis) components. By doing so, this methodology not only allows for identiﬁcation
of countries that are below their frontier,15 but also performs growth accounting without14For instance, the restrictions that Barrell and Pain (1997) mention on the application of their methodology are
that (a) one should not allow for a unit root, and that (b) when a lagged dependent variable is used,
autocorrelation in the error term cannot be allowed. Despite their claim of being able to include trending terms in
the regression, estimating a pure structural break model, in which all the coefﬁcients could change, generated non-
convergence in our estimations (especially for the trend variable).
15We allow for temporary imbalances in production process due to increased capital ﬂows to and from these
countries, possibly distorting usage of optimizing factor values during integration. Not allowing for such
imbalances may lead to false inference on TFP measures.
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divided into observable changes in inputs (DK, DL), changes in the efﬁciency parameter
(Dy), and technological innovations (DA ¼ Z). This division helps to separate the sources
of growth in GDP per capita, providing us with a more detailed picture of the underlying
causes. More detail on the Malmquist index is available in Appendix A.3.
To summarize, the combination of our theoretical framework and empirical
methodology contributes to the literature on conditional convergence and the growth
effects of technological spillovers.16 First, we utilize a less restrictive deﬁnition of
integration than do previous studies, so we are more ambitious in trying to obtain
inferences about variables that are not observable, such as technological innovations, Z,
and efﬁciency, y. By using a stochastic endogenous-growth model, we are able to
separately analyze the impact of integration on the steady state, productivity growth and
the convergence rate. The model shows that the sharing of a wider body of knowledge base
results in changes in all three. Second, we test for the signiﬁcance of these effects by
inspecting the structural breaks in these parameters originating from integration into an
economic union. Third, data envelopment analyses (or the Malmquist index) help us
distinguish the productivity impact of integration from temporary movements in the
growth rate, such as changes in input accumulation patterns and the transitions from one
steady state to another. Not accounting for such short-run movements may complicate the
measurement of productivity, as in CH (1995), to be inaccurate. Fourth, we allow for a
spectrum of convergence rates, including a no-convergence scenario, by considering
unrestricted forms of serial correlation in the uit of Eq. (24). Finally, by incorporating
structural funds explicitly into the model, we attempt to account for the institutional
beneﬁts of integration. The next section elaborates on our data and the empirical results we
obtain from the application of the methodologies described above.5. Empirical results
5.1. Data
We employ two separate datasets, covering the last ﬁve members to join the EU15,
namely, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, along with France as the
benchmark country. All data are quarterly and the sample period runs from 1980:Q1 to
2004:Q4. The ﬁrst data set, which consists of GDP per capita, is obtained from
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. We construct real GDP per capita data
in Euros based on the European Currency Unit (ECU) and later Euro exchange rates.
Since the classical deﬁnition of convergence and Eq. (15) refer to the log of real GDP per
capita, we take the natural logarithm of all the series. The second data set, which includes
annual capital stock, GDP (except for Sweden all in ﬁxed euros) and employment series, is
obtained from the Total Economy Growth Accounting Database of the Groningen Growth
and Development Center and The Conference Board. The data set is compiled mostly from
OECD National Accounts.17 Capital stock and GDP data for Sweden are converted into
Euros, using the IFS exchange rate series mentioned above.16See Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Coe and Helpman (1995).
17Further details on the source of the data can be found in http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/Data/Growth-
accounting/sources_TEG05.pdf.
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Table 1
Endogenous PSW break test of the deterministic trend of country GDP/capita (difference from the French
Benchmark)
Countries Pre-mean Pre-trend Post-mean Post-trend Estimated break date Accession date
Austria 0.165** 0.004** 0.069* 0.000 1996Q3 1995Q1
Finland 0.059 0.008** 0.150** 0.005** 1991Q3 1995Q1
Portugal 1.628** 0.010** 0.994** 0.006** 1990Q3 1986Q1
Spain 0.762** 0.001 0.538** 0.002 1988Q1 1986Q1
Sweden 0.173** 0.002 0.068 0.002 1992Q3 1995Q1
Notes: Reported estimates come from the estimation of Eq. (28) using the Vogelsang (2001) test on individual
GDP per capita differences from France. Pre-mean and post-mean values represent mean deviation in logs from
French GDP per capita before and after the accession periods, respectively. **(*) indicates 95% (90%)
signiﬁcance levels. Therefore, insigniﬁcance in mean or trend indicates same mean or trend with that of France.
Estimated break date reports the endogenously attained date while the last column shows the accession date of
each country.
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As mentioned earlier, our initial results are derived from a ﬁltering process that initially
extracts information on the levels and breaks of the deterministic trend components of the
GDP per capita difference from the French benchmark and then obtains inferences on
the convergence rate. Table 1 displays the results from a structural break estimation of the
deterministic trend (Vogelsang, 2001). The results seem puzzling for some countries
because the endogenously determined break dates are at varying points in the datasets;
only Austria seems to have a break date at its accession period. We believe the main reason
for these ﬁndings lies in the events that took place around 1992, in particular the ERM
crisis.18 Our simulation results, which are not reported here for space considerations, show
that when multiple breaks exist, single break tests used in our analysis tend to ﬁnd the
break point in between the two breaks.19 Because the multiple break methodology of Bai
and Perron (1998) performs poorly in detecting trend breaks with possible nonstationarity,
we decrease the number of breaks in the data by concentrating on events other than the
ERM crisis that occurred in the 25 years covered in the analysis. To do this, we remove a
year of data from both sides of the crisis and then make a simple mean adjustment, adding
a constant for the post-1993 period to eliminate the discontinuity. In a way, the ERM crisis
removal provides us with a rough picture of how GDP per capita ﬁgures of the sample
countries would look like if the decline caused by the ERM crisis had not taken place.2018We thank a referee for correctly pointing out that, besides the ERM crisis, other factors such as the
completion of the Single Market in 1992 and the opening up of Eastern Europe to world markets had signiﬁcant
impacts on the process of overall European integration, causing a signiﬁcant adjustment in trade ﬂows among
European economies, especially for Spain and Portugal.
19Simulations were run on mainly two different themes, the ﬁrst one changing the break magnitude and the
other changing the distance between the two breaks. Overall results show increased likelihood of irrelevant dates
as: (1) breaks are indistinguishable from each other in magnitude and (2) these breaks get farther away from each
other. More detail on these results can be provided by the authors upon request.
20The Vogelsang test is designed to measure a ‘‘simultaneous’’ mean and trend break independent of the serial
correlation. Had things been any different after the ERM (i.e., if the countries moved to another steady state
path), the Vogelsang test would place the break at the artiﬁcial one we generated.
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Table 2
Endogenous PSW break test of the deterministic trend of country GDP/capita (difference from the French
Benchmark) (ERM removed)
Countries Pre-mean Pre-trend Post-mean Post-trend Estimated break date Accession date
Austria 0.166** 0.004** 0.023* 0.000 1996Q3 1995Q1
Finland 0.092** 0.010** 0.499** 0.004* 1994Q3 1995Q1
Portugal 1.508** 0.001** 1.342** 0.007** 1987Q4 1986Q1
Spain 0.749** 0.000 0.610** 0.004** 1987Q3 1986Q1
Sweden 0.181** 0.002* 0.361** 0.001 1995Q3 1995Q1
Notes: Reported estimates come from the estimation of Eq. (28) using the Vogelsang (2001) test on individual
GDP per capita differences from France as mentioned below Table 1. Hence, negative numbers indicate
coefﬁcients below those of France. The only difference between the two tables comes from the removal of 1 year
windows from each side of the of the ERM crisis in 1992. Estimated break date reports the endogenously attained
date while the last column shows the accession date of each country.
A.M. Kutan, T.M. Yigit / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 1370–1395 1383Our contention is that, if this method were inappropriate, we would bear the costs of data
removal and mean adjustment by endogenously ﬁnding the new break around our
artiﬁcially generated one. The ﬁndings show that this is not the case.
Table 2 illustrates the results with two years removed from data around the ERM crisis.
The second and fourth columns of both tables display pre- and post-break mean difference
from that of the benchmark of log GDP per capita, namely m1 and m2 of Eq. (28),
respectively; the third and the ﬁfth columns show the pre- and post-break parameter
estimates for the productivity growth, d1 and d2, respectively; and the last columns report
the endogenously estimated break date along with the actual membership dates. To better
understand how to interpret these results, consider Austria. This country exhibits a lower
quarterly mean GDP per capita compared to France (in log terms) and about 0.4% higher
productivity growth than France prior to accession. After 1995, the two counties’
productivity growth is equalized, and Austria’s GDP per capita marginally exceeds that of
France. The results indicate that our methodology, though unconventional, is able to
highlight some interesting patterns about the break dates and productivity growth rates.
Note that in Table 2 the endogenously determined break dates are strikingly close to
each country’s accession date. Next, observe that the initial GDP per capita levels of every
country, except Sweden, lag behind that of France. This trend changes after 1995 with all
the three latecomers having higher mean GDP per capita levels than does France. It is
noteworthy that the countries that joined the EU early beneﬁt from strong productivity
increases while the others do worse when compared to France.21 This ﬁnding is puzzling
and requires further scrutiny because our model suggests that integration should lead to
the sharing of innovations and hence productivity growth in all of the member countries.21The signiﬁcant productivity growth rates are not only different from 0, but they are also different from one
another between the two periods. We conducted a Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate how one regime differs
from another. With a sample size of 100 and structural change coefﬁcient values close to the estimates in Table 2,
we apply Vogelsang’s method to 2000 generated series. While not a formal test with analytic properties, the
outcome of the simulation exercise is in line with the theory developed in this paper and supports our claim that
membership generates a change in the mean (steady state) and trend (technological growth rate) parameters.
Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
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Fig. 1. Net operational transfers after membership (% of GDP).
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so we try to identify other differences that could have led to this growth disparity.
It is interesting to observe that other members’ GDP per capita, in comparison to that
of France, changes according to the time of accession; in particular, a decline in the relative
productivity occurs after 1995 in those countries with a GDP per capita level close to
that of France. This observation might explain why some relatively wealthier countries
tend to hesitate to join the EU. The institutional arrangements of the EU, namely the
Structural and Cohesion Funds or net budget transfers that these countries receive or
contribute depending on their need for income equalization may play an important role
in this decision to join or not. As shown in Fig. 1, the countries that display higher
productivity growth levels compared to France were net recipients of EU operational
funds, whereas the ones who experienced losses in their comparative productivity were
net contributors.22 Upon closer examination, the transfer levels closely correspond to
the productivity performance of each joining member.23 For instance, Portugal and
Spain have increases in their productivity and the large inﬂows of operational funds,
while Sweden and Finland, who experienced declines in their productivity down to
French levels, were net givers. Austria, being a net giver one year and net recipient
in the next, experienced a decline in its productivity but maintained a level above that of
France. In short, these result suggest one of the following: Either there is a productivity
effect of Structural and Cohesion Funds not included in the theory section or all
sample countries are moving gradually from one steady state to another, causing fi to
affect not only the steady state levels as in Eq. (23) but also the growth rate to these new22The ﬂows of structural funds in actuality are higher than the net operational transfers values used in this
study, as the latter constitutes only a small of part of the EU budget. The comparison of individual country
performances to the EU benchmark and lack of long-run time series data on Structural and Cohesion Funds
dictated our choice of using net operational transfers. In addition, using much larger Cohesion Fund inﬂows
would only strengthen our results.
23The cross-sectional correlation between the productivity growth changes and the average net operational
transfers is 0.95.
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implications: (1) Structural operations of the EU are effective and serving their purpose in
increasing the steady state levels, but (2) they are also costly in the short run in terms of a
lower growth rate among the net contributors. However, considering the eventual decline
in transfers as the members of the EU converge and the productivity beneﬁts of being a
member of a more prosperous union, the temporary growth costs of the transition period
to the wealthier countries should not be substantial.5.3. Decomposition of productivity using the Malmquist indexes
The above results and the conclusions we draw from them are consistent with the theory
in LPS (1997) only under the critical assumption that the sample countries are
continuously in their steady states. However, as seen from the section above, examining
growth rates does not provide a clear picture of (i) the changes in the steady state and
(ii) how fast the transition from on steady state to another occurs. We also need to be sure
that the breaks in the mean and the growth rate in GDP per capita are not the results
of the inﬂow (outﬂow) of capital into (from) the new members after their accession, and
that the trend coefﬁcient truly represents the productivity growth rate. Hence, we
supplement our earlier results with a data envelopment approach that takes into
account the short run deviations from the steady states. Consequently, we further probe
the changes in productivity with the use of Malmquist indexes prior to moving on to the
analysis of convergence rate.
Because the factor shares of our sample countries are similar,25 the production functions
of the sample countries and of the benchmark can be grouped in the following simpliﬁed
form
Yit=yit
YFt=yFt
¼ AitZit
AFt
xit
xFt
 a
,
where y is again the inefﬁciency parameter, A and Z represent productivity measures, x is,
without loss of generality, the composite input (K and L), a is the common factor share,
and subscripts i and F represent country i and France, respectively. Assuming that the
exogenous productivity growths of sample countries are the same as that of France,26
i.e., Ait ﬃ AFt,
lnðYitÞ  lnðYFtÞ ¼ ½lnðZitÞ þ ½lnðxitÞ  lnðxFtÞ þ ½lnðyitÞ  lnðyFtÞ, (30)
where the term in the ﬁrst brackets on the right hand side shows the relative ‘‘technological
change’’ purely due to integration, the middle term is the input differences, and the last
bracketed term represents the relative ‘‘efﬁciency change’’. These relative performances are24To be more precise, due to the change in the steady state in Eq. (23) (the terms with z and f), the steady state
level of capital will increase at the rate of _k=k ¼ ðsþ f Þk1a  ðgþ nþ zþ dÞ, causing the output per capita to
increase at _y=y ¼ aðsþ f Þk1a  aðgþ nþ zþ dÞ þ ðgþ zÞ. These equations show that the speed of growth in the
transition phase will be affected by the difference between the steady state levels and the foreign capital inﬂow
(hence the cross sectional correlation). Estimating a trend function even in the case of a nonlinear transition
period should not pose a big problem for our estimation since the new estimated trend change will be more
conservative than the actual trend change.
25See Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001).
26Note that France received the integration beneﬁt, Z, having joined the Union earlier.
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Fig. 2. Relative cumulative efﬁciency change index.
A.M. Kutan, T.M. Yigit / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 1370–13951386shown in Figs. 2 and 3.27 These Figures report cumulative index values, which are obtained
by sequential multiplication of the year-to-year values of each index. The results show that
(i) relative efﬁciency worsens for early joiners, namely, Spain and Portugal, which is likely
due to their fast paced capital accumulation and declining unemployment, indicating their
inability to absorb these inputs at the same pace (see Denis et al., 2002, who ﬁnd Spain’s
NAIRU decreasing from around 20% down to 11% and Portugal’s from over 8% to
under 5%; also see Fig. 4 for their output per capita), (ii) Sweden and Finland show
improvement in relative efﬁciency, mostly related to the ERM recovery (Fig. 4 conﬁrms
the efﬁciency ﬁndings in (i) and (ii)), (iii) all countries display higher rates of technological
change than France, especially after their membership, (iv) the technological change rate of27Tabular values for all the graphs are available from the authors upon request.
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A.M. Kutan, T.M. Yigit / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 1370–1395 1387early joiners slows down in the second half of the 1990s, while the late joiners’
improvement picks up with their membership;28 and (v) the decomposed results are
different from those obtained from plain growth accounting of TFP because they can
determine the source of improvements. Fig. 5 displays a calculation of TFP’s contribution
to potential output growth by Denis et al., 2002, which does not allow for inefﬁciency or
temporary deviations from the steady state.29 Since their TFP is effectively the product of
our two M-indexes, the picture one gets of the productivity impact of integration is quite28We should also note that the R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP of late-joiners (not reported here)
increase signiﬁcantly in the late 1990s.
29They calculate TFP contribution using potential output. Another calculation that uses actual output and ﬁnds
similar results is not reported for the sake of brevity.
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Table 3
Bai–Perron structural break test results in the autoregressive (1l ¼ convergence) coefﬁcient (difference from the
French Benchmark) (ERM removed)
Country UDMAX WDMAX Sequential
(2|1)
Sequential
(3|2)
BIC choice Break dates
at 5%
1l
Austria 2.25 2.35 0.85 0.86 0 0.41
Finland 14.41** 14.41** 4.78 4.78 1 1993Q1 0.82–0.26
Portugal 5.97 7.52 7.70 1.83 0 0.31
Spain 11.24** 16.23** 1.53 1.36 1 1985Q3 0.09–0.73
Sweden 7.99* 14.50** 7.40 2.12* 0 (1995Q1) 0.31 (to
0.37)
Notes: Reported results come from the Bai–Perron multiple structural break test using the speciﬁcation yt ¼
fþ ltyt1 þ ut for the dependent variables, which are detrended GDP/capita deviations from France. A
maximum of three breaks are allowed in l. UDMAX and WDMAX tests report double maximum tests, which
have the null of no-break versus the alternative of at least one. Sequential tests examine the null of r breaks versus
r1. ** (*) indicates 95% (90%) signiﬁcance levels. The results are reported in parentheses when the number of
breaks has not been conﬁrmed by the BIC. The last column reports 1l rather than the autoregressive coefﬁcient.
The above tests have been run with AR(1) speciﬁcation. Changing the lag speciﬁcations to higher orders do not
lead to any signiﬁcant changes other than no-rejection result in Sweden in the double maximum tests, indicating
lack of any breaks.
A.M. Kutan, T.M. Yigit / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 1370–13951388different. We observe that Spain and Portugal beneﬁted early on from TFP growth, but in the
second half of 1990s, countries like Finland and Sweden showed superior TFP performance.
This conﬂict in results is important because it shows that a failure to account for inefﬁciency
in production could lead to the misperception that productivity falls in countries like Spain.
However, what seems to be a decline in the productivity is instead a signiﬁcant shifting out of
their frontier at a rate faster than that of France combined with even a larger imbalance in
their factor markets. In short, our theoretical claim of integration leading to improvement in
productivity is conﬁrmed. Spain and Portugal experienced a reduction in their efﬁciency,
likely due to the inability to efﬁciently utilize the large capital inﬂows and the wage-increasing
effect of structural operations geared to reduce unemployment in the early years of their EU
membership. Nonetheless, all countries showed strong productivity growth after their
accession due to the increase in the rate of technological improvement.
5.4. Convergence rates
In the ﬁnal section of our analysis, we estimate the convergence rates by using the BP
(1998) method, allowing for a maximum of three breaks in the convergence rate. The
results, reported in Table 3, show that only two countries, Spain and Finland, seem to have
a change in the convergence rate. Spain’s convergence has increased strongly after its
accession date, as suggested by theory. Finland experienced a decline in the convergence
rate; however, we believe that this ﬁnding is mainly due to the removal of the ERM
because the endogenous break date is close to the artiﬁcial one we created. The other
countries in the sample do not display noticeable changes in their convergence levels,
except for weak evidence of an increase in Sweden.30 The lack of convergence is not30There is weak evidence of a break for Sweden during its accession date, but it disappears at higher
autoregression speciﬁcations.
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possible reasons for these ﬁndings: A change in the serial correlation of technology process
in Eq. (6) and the serial correlation generated by the linear trend estimation in the
nonlinear transition phase. We rely on LPS’s empirical ﬁnding of no change in the serial
correlation of technology and focus on the latter possibility. Despite the assumption in
Solow’s growth theory of constant factor shares, it is not quite clear how the factor shares
would be determined during a transition period from one steady state to another. Allowing
for time varying factor shares during the transition produces a possible explanation to our
empirical results. Using the labor share of value added data from OECD STAN Indicators
database31 we observe that the countries in which we fail to ﬁnd a convergence rate break,
Austria and Portugal, have opposing short-run movements in the technology parameter, z,
and the labor share, (1a). Since the convergence rate is the product of these two
parameters, their opposite movements offset the effect of integration on the convergence
rate. When they move in the same direction, as in Spain, the outcome is the drastic short-
run increase in Spain’s convergence rate. This explanation is only valid during transition
from one steady state to another, and the factor shares will again become constant in
the steady state. Thus, we only display the short-run ﬂuctuations in these parameters in
Figs. 6a–c32 and leave further analysis of how transition process affects short run
ﬂuctuations in factor shares for future research. We conclude our discussion with a ﬁnal
observation about the level of convergence rates. Our convergence rate estimates are
higher than the 0.24 mean estimate of LPS (1997) for the OECD countries, but the
statistical difference of these differences is not investigated.
5.5. Summary of the findings
In conclusion, we ﬁnd evidence supporting most of the testable implications of our
theoretical model. The steady state levels of income, productivity growth rates, and
some members’ convergence rates increase with integration into the EU. We believe
that the mixed results regarding productivity changes are likely due to the transition
from one steady state to another after accession (see footnote 24). Therefore, the large
increase in these economies’ trend growth, as suggested by the structural break tests
results, is likely affected by the inﬂow of capital in the form of Structural and
Cohesion Funds. Nonetheless, our Malmquist technological change index indicates
that productivity increases for both donor and recipient countries, supporting our
expectation of knowledge and technology diffusion. We observe the same phenomenon
in the three later joining countries, though more so in Finland and Sweden than in
Austria. Despite showing signiﬁcant productivity increases after their accession, the
savings outﬂow might have temporarily constrained these countries’ growth rates
during the transition period. In short, our empirical evidence suggests the importance
of productivity spillovers and knowledge sharing in the Union, but it also indicates
that other important aspects of integration associated with its institutional operations,
such as the net budget transfers, including Structural and Cohesion Funds, can also
have a signiﬁcant short-run impact on how fast countries converge to the Union
standards.31http://oberon.sourceoecd.org
32The reported labor shares are relative to France.
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Fig. 6. (a) Austria’s technological change rate and labor share, (b) Portugal convergence rate and labor; share,
and (c) Spain convergence rate and labor share.
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In this study, we use a new methodology to estimate the impact of European integration
on convergence and productivity growth, one that does not require the use of proxy
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A.M. Kutan, T.M. Yigit / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 1370–1395 1391variables. Our theoretical formulation captures the unobservable process of knowledge
sharing resulting from integration and its effect on growth, productivity, and convergence
rate after accession. Using a series of structural break tests and data envelopment analysis,
we test the theoretical predictions of the model for the ﬁve recent members to the EU15.
The results show improved rates of productivity growth after accession over and above the
EU benchmark level. In addition, we observe an increased pace of overall growth due to
capital accumulation as a result of Structural and Cohesion Funds.
Our key implication for policy is that our results show that integration enhances
productivity and growth. The institutional aspects of EU integration, such as Structural
and Cohesion Funds, play an effective role in furthering economic growth. Providing such
funds for new member states, despite temporary distortions in the pricing of productive
factors in the short run, helps the recipient economies in the long run by allowing them to
catch up faster with the core EU15 members.Acknowledgement
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applies.Appendix A. Structural break tests and the calculation of the Malmquist index
A.1. Vogelsang (1998, 2001) test
Vogelsang considers the speciﬁcation33
yt ¼ Xytbþ ut, (A.1)
where Xyt is [1, t]. For more than one coefﬁcient restriction, one of the tests can be
summarized as
PSWT ¼
T1ðRb^ rÞ0½RðX 0yXyÞ1R01ðRb^ rÞ
ð100T1s2z expðbJT ðmÞÞÞ
, (A.2)
where R and r represents the restriction matrix and vector , respectively, and JT is the Park
and Choi (1988) unit root test statistic obtained from the following regression
yt ¼ Xytbþ
Xm
i¼2
cit
i þ ut,
JT ðmÞ ¼ ðRSSy  RSSJ Þ=RSSJ . ðA:3Þ
JT is the Wald statistic that tests the joint hypothesis of c2 ¼ c3 ¼    ¼ cm ¼ 0. In short,
Vogelsang’s test corrects for the potential incorrect inference, mainly due to the possibility33For details and other speciﬁcations like PS and TW statistics please refer to Vogelsang (1998).
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case of nonstationarity.
Spanning the standard set of breaks introduced by Perron (1989), namely the mean,
trend, and the mean and trend, Vogelsang (2001) derives the asymptotics in cases of both
known and unknown break dates.34 We favor not imposing a break date in our estimations
since ﬁnding the break dates endogenously at the times of accession would be a direct test
of our theory. In the endogenous break tests, initially the break date is estimated by
maximizing a Wald statistic for each possible TbAL where L is the sample trimmed from
both ends. Then, using the estimated break date, normalized t-statistics are obtained using
the altered version of Eq. (A.1) as follows:
yt ¼ m1DU1t þ m2DU2t þ d1DT1t þ d2DT2t þ ut, (A.4)
where DU1t ¼ 1 if tpTb (the break date) and zero otherwise, DU2t ¼ 1 if t4Tb and
zero otherwise, DT1t ¼ t if tpTb and zero otherwise, and ﬁnally DT2t ¼ t Tb if t4Tb
and zero otherwise. His analysis, using Maddison’s data (Maddison, 1991), and a later
application by Tomljanovich and Vogelsang (2002)35 that focuses mainly on convergence
issues, provide interesting exploitations of this methodology.A.2. Bai and Perron (1998) test
The general form of the Bai–Perron methodology considers the following multiple
structural break model, with m breaks (m+1 regimes)
yt ¼ x0tbþ z0tdj þ ut (A.5)
for t ¼ Tj1 þ 1; . . . ;Tj and j ¼ 1; . . . ;mþ 1: yt is the observed dependent variable at time
t; xt (p 1) and zt (q 1) are the vector of covariates, b and dj are the corresponding
vectors of coefﬁcients, and ut is the disturbance term at time t. The break points (T) are
treated as unknown, and are estimated together with the unknown coefﬁcients when T
observations are available. In the terminology of BP, this is a partial structural change
model, in the sense that b does not change, and is effectively estimated over the entire
sample. If p ¼ 0, this becomes a pure structural change model where all coefﬁcients are
subject to change. The recommended procedure for detecting structural breaks, suggested
by BP, is the following. First, calculate the UDMAX and WDMAX statistics.36 These are
double maximum tests, where the null hypothesis of no structural breaks is tested against
the alternative of an unknown number of breaks. These tests are used to determine if at
least one structural break is present. In addition, the SupF(0|l) is a series of Wald tests for
the hypothesis of 0 breaks vs. l breaks. In this paper, the maximum number of breaks (l) is
chosen to be 3. If these tests show evidence of at least one structural break, then the
number of breaks can be determined by the sequential statistic, SupF(l+1|l). If this test is
signiﬁcant at the 5% level, then l+1 breaks are chosen. Finally, we choose the number of
breaks by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC).34Interestingly, one of the supremum statistics he suggests performs better than some popular statistics in
identifying shifts in slope.
35We are grateful to the authors for providing us with the Gauss routine used in this paper.
36UDMAX stands for equally weighted double maximum test while WDMAX refers to the weighted version.
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Using the notation in Fa¨re et al. (1994), a production technology St{xt, yt} maps inputs
xt into outputs yt, producing the distance functions
Dtoðxt; ytÞ ¼ ðsupfy : ðxt; yytÞ 2 StgÞ1
that ‘‘yseek the reciprocal of the greatest proportional increase in outputs, given inputs,
such that output is feasible’’ (Fa¨re et al., 1994, p. 69). In this setup, subscript ‘o’ stands for
output and y could be described as the inefﬁciency parameter, measuring how far the
production is from the frontier. Using the distance functions from consecutive time
periods, one can obtain the Malmquist index
Moðytþ1;xtþ1; yt; xtÞ ¼
Dtþ1o ðxtþ1; ytþ1Þ
Dtoðxt; ytÞ
 D
t
oðxtþ1; ytþ1Þ
Dtþ1o ðxtþ1; ytþ1Þ
 !
Dtoðxt; ytÞ
Dtþ1o ðxt; ytÞ
 !" #1=2
,
(A.6)
where the ﬁrst term measures the technological change (or the shift in the production
frontier) and the geometric mean of the ratios inside the brackets measure the change in
efﬁciency (or how much the distance to the frontier changes). Improvements in both parts
of the index are shown by values greater than unity. For the Cobb–Douglas production
function yt ¼ AðtÞPNn¼1ðxnt Þan the distance function becomes
Dtoðxt; ytÞ ¼ yt
.
A tð Þ
YN
n¼1ðx
n
t Þan
 
leading to the Malmquist index becoming the ratio of the efﬁciency parameters
Moðytþ1;xtþ1; yt; xtÞ ¼ Aðtþ 1Þ=AðtÞ. (A.7)References
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